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In the opening weeks of his administration, President Donald Trump overturned a
longstanding U.S. commitment to territorial partition and a two-state model for
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israeli prime minister Benjamin
Netanyahu seized the opportunity to demand “overriding security control over
the entire area west of the Jordan River” while exploring regional approaches
that bypass the Palestinians. At the same time, a host of Israeli politicians are
reviving older models such as limited autonomy without political sovereignty
and partial territorial annexation, or advocating for other forms of separation
with Israel’s continued control. The resulting middle ground—neither two states
nor one—poses a great risk to Palestinian self-determination. By situating recent
developments in a broader historical context going back to the autonomy plan
of Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin, this essay provides an overview of a
shifting political discourse and examines the consequences for the fate of the
Palestinians today.
Netanyahu’s Art of the Deal
IN ONE OF THE MOST revealing moments during the joint White House press conference between
President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on 15 February 2017, a reporter
asked the U.S. president if he was “ready to give up the notion of [the] two-state solution.”Would he
be willing “to hear different ideas” from Israel’s premier, such as “annex[ing] . . . parts of the West
Bank and unrestricted settlement construction?” Dispensing with decades of official U.S. policy on
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Trump responded like a carnival barker presiding over the stately
East Room. “So I’m looking at two-state and one-state, and I like the one that both parties like,”
he said to an outburst of laughter. “I’m very happy with the one that both parties like. I can live
with either one. I thought for a while the two-state looked like it may be the easier of the two. But
honestly, if Bibi and if the Palestinians—if Israel and the Palestinians are happy—I’m happy with
the one they like the best.”1
Notwithstanding the bonhomie of such an exchange, decades of experience should not fool
anyone into believing that Trump’s comments would lead to a just outcome along equitable lines.
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Historians will no doubt look back on this press conference as an important juncture in the
wider trajectory of the U.S.-led peace process. Alongside the president’s veritable “wink wink” to
Netanyahu to “hold back on settlements for a little bit,” talk of a “great peace deal” was
clarifying.2 Dropping all pretense of diplomatic protocol, Trump upended a longstanding U.S.
commitment to territorial partition as the basis for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By
flatly renouncing the assumed model of an Israeli state and a Palestinian state existing side by
side, he left open the possibility of alternative forms of sovereignty, or perhaps no sovereignty at
all, for the Palestinians. It now remains unclear what possible options might be available to the
Palestinians, and how—if at all—they might achieve their self-determination in this uncharted
political environment.3
Despite the attention given to Trump’s rhetoric, Netanyahu’s follow-up response was actually the
more significant revelation of the press conference. Asked whether he had come toWashington to tell
the president that he was “backing off the two-state solution,” the Israeli prime minister insisted that
rather than “deal[ing] with labels, I want to deal with substance.”He then offered two prerequisites for
peace. The first, “Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state,” was a familiar and highly
contested demand that Netanyahu first explicitly raised in his 2009 speech at Bar-Ilan University.
But the second prerequisite was less well-known. “In any peace agreement,” Netanyahu continued,
“Israel must retain the overriding security control over the entire area west of the Jordan River.
Because if we don’t, we know what will happen—because otherwise we’ll get another radical
Islamic terrorist state in the Palestinian areas exploding the peace, exploding the Middle East.”
Put simply, the Israeli prime minister leveraged expansive security demands as a means to render
Israel’s permanent sovereign control of the entirety of the land between the Jordan River and the
Mediterranean Sea a prerequisite for peace.4 It was an astonishing demand, based on a familiar
theme, but linked to a new vision for dealing with the Palestinians. Netanyahu’s remarks were a
clear rewording of his 2009 request for U.S. support to prevent the emergence of a Palestinian army
and maintain Israeli control over Palestinian airspace. In his speech at the annual Bar-Ilan
conference that year, he insisted that “the Palestinian area must be demilitarized,”5 and reported
telling President Barack Obama just two months earlier, “If we get a guarantee of demilitarization,
and if the Palestinians recognize Israel as the Jewish state, we are ready to agree to a real peace
agreement, a demilitarized Palestinian state side by side with the Jewish state.”6 The prime minister’s
earlier request did not sway Washington but his latest introduction of the more expansive Israeli
demand for security control over the entire area west of the Jordan River will no doubt fall on
favorable ears inside the Trump administration. When linked with the prime minister’s promise that
“I won’t evacuate settlements,” delivered at the 2014 World Economic Forum in Davos, one
wonders what might be left for Palestinians after calculating all the requisite subtractions.7
Netanyahu was well equipped in meeting the best-selling author of Trump: The Art of the Deal.8
His Washington visit even elicited praise from the most threatening members of his coalition, who
celebrated the invocation of these latest demands. On his very active Facebook account, the leader of
Habayit Hayehudi (the Jewish Home Party) and Minister of Education Naftali Bennett posted the
following message in Hebrew shortly after the press conference concluded: “A new era. After
twenty-four years, the Palestinian flag was removed from the mast today and replaced with the
Israeli flag. It strengthens the prime minister, who revealed leadership and courage and fortified
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the security of Israel.”9 Bennett is a direct competitor of Netanyahu’s and believes the prime minister
has not gone far enough in marginalizing Palestinian aspirations for statehood. “We’re in a
government that I insisted not have [the establishment of] a Palestinian state in its guidelines,”
Bennett has said. “If we are talking about a return to the 1967 lines and the division of Jerusalem,
I won’t just resign from the government, I’ll topple it. We shouldn’t give up an inch of land, we
shouldn’t give any land to the Palestinians,” he added emphatically, in an interview with Israel’s
Channel 2 television station in 2016.10 His praise of Netanyahu’s visit was therefore noteworthy,
signaling the triumphant revival of non-statist models for resolving the Palestinian question.
Reviving Autonomy
What might such a model look like? In the Channel 2 interview, Bennett spoke openly of
“Palestinian autonomy on steroids,” a version of his “stability plan” whereby West Bank
Palestinians living in Area A (under full control of the Palestinian Authority or PA) and Area B
(under joint control between the PA and Israel) would govern themselves without external
interference but without true independence. Area C (and the Israeli settlements that fill it) would
be annexed to Israel, and Palestinians who lived there would be granted Israeli citizenship.11
Variations on this model of limited autonomy and annexation are very much in vogue among the
Israeli Right today, and they are presented as an innovative and just solution to the Palestinian
question. The ideas are premised on the elision of sovereign Palestinian political control over
contiguous territory, and date back to concepts originally introduced by Israel’s first Likud prime
minister, Menachem Begin.
In December of 1977, from the floor of the Israeli Knesset, Begin had announced an autonomy
plan for the “Arab residents of Judea and Samaria” (Begin’s preferred terminology for theWest Bank
and Gaza Strip, and its Palestinian inhabitants). This plan was a nonterritorial form of autonomy for
the territories’ Palestinian population that would be facilitated by administrative councils overseeing
local matters such as education, housing, transport, agriculture, and health. Sovereign control of the
territory, however, was not to be given up, with security and public order remaining in the hands of
the Israeli authorities. “We have a right and a demand for sovereignty over these areas of Eretz
Yisrael,” Begin told the Knesset. “This is our land and it belongs to the Jewish nation rightfully.”12
For Begin, autonomy was a benevolent means to deal with the Palestinian inhabitants of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip and curtail Palestinian aspirations for self-determination. He believed
he had found a solution for the challenges that emerged after Israel’s conquest in 1967, one that
could both bypass direct annexation of the territories and uphold liberal claims to protecting a
national minority. The genesis of this idea was marked by Begin’s offer of full Israeli citizenship to
“Arab residents of Judea and Samaria” in June 1975, reiterated in a speech to the French
parliament in December 1976. But while citizenship for “Arab residents” was presented alongside
the emerging option of cultural autonomy, in practice, the 1978 Camp David negotiations ensured
that full territorial sovereignty was retained by Israel.13
Begin’s plan was an attempt to assert Israeli sovereign control (de facto or de jure) over the
territory across the Green Line, while extending limited political rights to its indigenous
population. Simultaneously, his government worked to expand the size and number of Jewish
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settlements, leading to the massive expansion of Israel’s “matrix of control” in the West Bank and
Gaza over the course of the 1980s.14 Begin’s autonomy plan was initially presented to the
administration of Jimmy Carter, and later to Ronald Reagan’s White House. It was the subject of
extensive (and little-known) negotiations between Egypt and Israel after Camp David, lasting
from 1979 to 1982. Ultimately, what was known as the autonomy talks failed with the onset of the
1982 Lebanon War as Israel’s political targeting of Palestinian nationalism gave way to a military
focus on the Palestine Liberation Organization presence in Beirut.
Yet autonomy’s imprint on the peace process has remained strong, most notably instantiated
by the 1993 Oslo Accords.15 Although ostensibly designed as an interim arrangement, the Oslo
framework provided limited self-rule (by the PA) and local control over domestic matters.
Twenty-four years after Oslo, Bennett and his contemporaries are speaking the same language as
Begin. They offer Palestinians limited control over their internal affairs, from oversight of West
Bank sewage systems to education, agriculture, health, and labor. Likud member of the Knesset
(MK) Yoav Kisch recently suggested introducing an updated version of Begin’s original autonomy
plan,16 which would dissolve the PA and impose Israeli sovereignty over all settlements in
the Jordan Valley. Rather than citizenship, Kisch’s approach would grant Palestinians “an
autonomous administrative region without full sovereignty”17 under Israeli administration,
preventing them from voting in a sovereign parliament and enshrining their unequal status. “I
will never allow Arabs living in Judea and Samaria the right to vote in the Knesset since this
would undermine the Jewish character of the state,” Kisch explained in an interview with the
Jerusalem Post. “But we can also not allow a Palestinian state because of the security risk,” he
added.18 One need not try very hard to imagine the specter of South African-style Bantustans
rising in the hilly West Bank landscape.
Despite Kisch’s claims that Israel would not incur sanctions as a result, his approach is a clear
attempt to enshrine functional apartheid in the literal sense. His view is shared by another crucial
political constituency, the Israeli settler movement. In a stunning op-ed in the New York Times,
the international spokesman for the Jewish community of Hebron, Yishai Fleisher, offered a
candid and blunt assessment of Israel’s possible future.19 He dismissed Israeli attempts to keep the
two-state solution in play, arguing that the settlers have never accepted the policy that has
“worked to legitimize the idea that the territory of Judea and Samaria is Arab land and that Israel
is an intractable occupier.” Fleischer rehearses long-standing exclusive claims of Jewish national
rights to the land and to “indigenous existence,” while dismissing the government’s own
ambivalence about the territorial conquests of 1967, and he openly invokes the spirit of Begin as a
guide for new approaches to the Palestinian issue.
In presenting his view that Israeli sovereignty should be extended across all of the occupiedWest
Bank, Fleischer is mindful of the new administration inWashington. “There is a historic opportunity
to have an open discussion of real alternatives,” he states, “unhampered by the shibboleths of the
past.” He dismisses those who would argue that there is no alternative to a two-state model.
Rather than make room for another state alongside Israel, he contends,
Arabs can live in Israel, as other minorities do, with personal rights, not national rights. . . . Most
settlers say without ambivalence that the two-state solution is dead, and the time has come for a
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discussion of new options by which Israel would hold onto the West Bank and eventually assert
Israel[i] sovereignty there, just as we did with the Golan Heights and eastern Jerusalem. Yes, Israel
will have to grapple with questions of the Arab population’s rights, and the issues of the country’s
security and Jewish character, but we believe those questions can be worked out through the dem-
ocratic process.
Fleisher proceeds to lay out five alternative options, from the notion that “Jordan is Palestine,” to
Bennett’s plan for annexation of Area C, and perhaps most astonishingly, a new idea for Emirate-like
Palestinian cantons hatched by the infamous professor Mordechai Kedar of Bar-Ilan University.20 In
Kedar’s view, as explained by Fleisher, “the Palestinian Arabs are not a cohesive nation.” Rather, they
are “comprised of separate city-based clans,” and therefore such a plan “proposes Palestinian
autonomy for seven non-contiguous emirates in major Arab cities, as well as Gaza, which he
[Kedar] considers already an emirate.” As for the rest of the areas outside the major cities, Israel
would annex them and “offer Israeli citizenship” to their Palestinian inhabitants.21
Between Annexation and Separation
In contrast to these various notions of autonomy, the final two ideas cited by Fleisher suggest
either a version of annexation plus citizenship, or a proposal for outright population exchange. In
her 2014 book, The Israeli Solution: A One-State Plan for Peace in the Middle East, journalist
Caroline Glick suggested that Jews would not lose their demographic majority between the Jordan
River and the Mediterranean, and should therefore not fear annexation.22 Rather, the Jerusalem
Post journalist advocated, they should assert Israeli law in the West Bank and offer Palestinians
citizenship in Israel. Glick’s assertion challenges the prevailing view of many demographers, and
also leaves Gaza out of the equation. Tzipi Hotovely, Israel’s current deputy foreign minister, has
also suggested an iteration of Glick’s plan with residency rather than automatic citizenship. In her
view, only by swearing allegiance to a Jewish State might citizenship be conferred. Others prefer
the model of Puerto Rico, in the form of residency rights without voting rights in federal elections.
Israel’s president, Reuven Rivlin, has himself aligned with the view of annexation. A longstanding
liberal member of the right-wing camp, Rivlin concedes that the extension of Jewish sovereignty in the
occupied Palestinian territories necessitates the equal extension of law. “Israel has adopted international
law. [International law] does not allow a country acting according to it to apply and enforce its laws on
territories that are not under its sovereignty,” he said to a Jerusalem gathering of the B’Sheva
newspaper. “If it does so, it is a legal cacophony. It will cause Israel to be seen as an apartheid state,
which it is not.”23 As the president emphasized, “there is no question here. The government of Israel
is simply not allowed to apply the laws of the Knesset on territories that are not under the state’s
sovereignty.” Rivlin’s position suggests that granting full citizenship to Palestinians in the occupied
Palestinian territories might resolve this tension, but that of course would leave open the broader
question of the Jewish state’s political identity and demographic character.
Rivlin’s warning came in the wake of a settlement outpost legalization bill, approved by the
Knesset on 6 February 2017.24 Despite the best efforts of Netanyahu himself, Bennett pushed
through the bill before the prime minister’s meeting with Trump.25 Accelerated as a response to
Neither Two States nor One: The Palestine Question in the Age of Trump
Spring 2017 || 61
the evacuation of the illegal Amona outpost in early 2017, the bill was intended to bypass legal
limitations to the settlement project on private Palestinian land. In essence, the law legalizes land
theft from Palestinian landowners. By thumbing Israel’s nose at international law, the legislation
helps consolidate apartheid-like conditions on the ground.26 Criticisms of this formalization of
functional apartheid that ensued in some right-wing quarters evinced an attempt to offer a liberal
gloss on what is fast becoming a recipe for the worst possible outcome on the ground: the
extension of Jewish sovereignty across the entirety of the occupied Palestinian territories,
depriving Palestinians of either equal rights as citizens or real political sovereignty of their own.27
Centrist political leaders have also followed suit, in effect parroting the intentions of the Israeli
Right while employing language that opposes annexation. Opposition leader Isaac Herzog
outlined his “Ten Point Plan for Israeli-Palestinian Peace” in a Haaretz article that appeared in
February, suggesting an “updated road map” toward a two-state solution. Premised on the idea of
total separation, Herzog envisions a ten-year interim stage before negotiations. “The two peoples
will separate from each other, the Palestinian economy will advance, the regional infrastructure
will develop and the peace initiative’s principles will be implemented,” Herzog wrote. Utilizing
“moves outside the box,” the Labor Party chairman’s idea would circumvent the most contested
debates over territory by selectively limiting settlement construction. “This is how we’ll save the
settlement blocs and keep them under Israel’s sovereignty. It will be Zionism’s real victory,” he
Israeli soldiers bundle onto a bus a Jewish settler from the Amona outpost northeast of Ramallah,
evacuated in accordance with a High Court ruling. (1 February, Thomas Coex/AFP/Getty Images)
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concluded.28 The specifics of Herzog’s plan are not clearly delineated, nor do they account for
Palestinian aspirations in a meaningful sense.
Yair Lapid, chairman of the Yesh Atid (There Is a Future) Party, recently dropped his mention
of a demilitarized Palestinian state altogether and replaced it with talk of “separation in very slow
stages—fifteen to twenty years, the main element of which will be security arrangements.”29
Playing down a two-state outcome, Lapid echoes Herzog’s call for prolonged separation without a
political resolution. In a radio interview in February, he was very clear about the shortcomings of
a two-state outcome and his preference for interim measures. “We don’t want a Palestinian state.
It’s simply the best way to get rid of four million Palestinians whom we want to get out of our
lives . . . the question is not whether it’s right or not, but how to create the highest wall possible
between us and the Palestinians with security guarantees for Israelis.”30 Effectively, Lapid’s is a
path toward structural separation without relinquishing Israeli control.
It is this suspended middle ground—neither one state nor two—that is the greatest risk to
Palestinian self-determination, whether in the shape of independent statehood or equal rights within
some wider political configuration. Palestinians are well aware of the dangers inherent in the
proposals of Hebron’s settler leader, and by extension the ideas of Bennett, Kisch, Herzog, Lapid,
and Netanyahu himself. The thrust of these alternatives is to reify limited rights in place of either
a one-state or two-state outcome. Whether advocating truncated autonomy or unequal residency
rather than full citizenship, these ideas are retrograde and pernicious, and they have a checkered
historical track record, amounting in practice to a form of Palestinian state prevention.31
Netanyahu himself has long been an advocate of the “state-minus” idea for Palestinians.32 First
bandied about in the 1990s when he was primeminister in the wake of the Oslo Accords, the concept
suggests some form of self-rule minus an army. But the specifics of Netanyahu’s vision have always
remained hazy, even in his Trump press conference statement asserting Israeli security control west
of the Jordan River. As a strong proponent of conflict management, rather than resolution,
Netanyahu favors indeterminate ideas that cohere with other attempts to avoid the central
question of Palestinian sovereignty.33
In conjunction with this “state-minus” idea, former U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger
suggested to the participants of the 2016 annual Herzliya Conference that an interim agreement
for the Palestinians would be preferable to a regional solution.34 Kissinger first provided the
blueprint for conflict management during his shuttle diplomacy of the mid-1970s.35 It has since
been taken up by others attempting to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the leading
proponent of interim measures, U.S. ambassador Dennis Ross.36 The longstanding circulation of
these ideas in Netanyahu’s orbit has both served to defer Palestinian demands for sovereignty and
enabled settlement expansion. Whether in think-tank corners or through direct Israeli advocacy,
such ideas have often been promoted in Washington as well.
Back in August 1983, a young Netanyahu (then Israel’s deputy chief of mission in Washington)
attended meetings in the Reagan White House with Israel’s ambassador to the United States, Meir
Rosenne and Vice President George H. W. Bush. According to declassified minutes of those
meetings, which I have found in the Israel State Archives, Bush was deeply opposed to settlement
expansion in Israel, criticizing Rosenne’s claim that Jews should be permitted to live in the West
Bank. “You will have a hard time selling your position here,” Bush told the Israeli ambassador.
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“The U.S. is the most moderate in the world in its position on settlements, the President is a friend of
yours, but he thinks settlements are not conducive to peace.”Netanyahu then argued with Bush that
settlements were not the real issue. “Israel’s survival,” he told Bush, “would be in grave doubt if we
relinquished control of Judea and Samaria. The settlements there are a sign of Israel’s presence.”37
Bush wholeheartedly refuted such a bold assertion that Israel must retain the occupied Palestinian
territories to assure the country’s very survival. After becoming president, one particularly bitter
debate erupted around the U.S. refusal to grant Israel loan guarantees of $10 billion in light of
ongoing settlement expansion. Bush’s secretary of state, James Baker, famously recited the number
of the White House switchboard at a press conference, telling the Israelis, “When you are serious
about peace, call us!”38
With Trump’s election, circumstances have changed in Netanyahu’s favor. He is once again
trying to link Israeli security claims with territorially maximalist positions, and finding a more
sympathetic hearing in his meetings with U.S. officials. Reports have surfaced that Netanyahu
even raised the possibility of the United States recognizing Israel’s 1981 annexation of the Golan
Heights, which the U.S. government still treats as occupied Syrian territory.39 It is clear that the
transition from the Obama to the Trump administration is paving the way for major shifts on
core aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian and wider Arab-Israeli conflict. New regional dynamics have
also played a large part in this transformation, and arrangements that at one time seemed
unthinkable are now very much on the table.
Ethnic States
Before turning to the regional landscape, there is one key Israeli avenue for resolving the
Palestinian question that demands closer attention: demographic engineering. In its most
unreconstructed form, it is what former deputy speaker of the Knesset Moshe Feiglin advocates as
part of the platform of Zehut, his breakaway party from the Likud: “Jewish sovereignty in all parts
of the Land of Israel, and encouragement of voluntary emigration of the Arabs in Judea and
Samaria. Arabs who choose to remain may do so as permanent residents, after making a
declaration of loyalty to the Jewish state. The option of receiving Israeli citizenship will be given
after a protracted cooling-off period and compliance with conditions to be specified.”40
How exactly would this “voluntary emigration” proceed? Along with Martin Sherman of the
Israel Institute for Strategic Studies, Feiglin advocates that the “Arab populations must be
diminished—preferably by noncoercive means, such as economic inducements.”41 Citing the
precedent of what they described as Jewish expulsion from Arab lands in the aftermath of 1948,
Feiglin and Sherman suggest that “Palestinians in Judea and Samaria would be offered generous
compensation to emigrate voluntarily.”42 Presumably, the failure to induce Palestinians to leave
voluntarily would trigger coerced population transfer.
A far more developed vision for separating the two populations has recently been put forward by
Israel’s defense minister, Avigdor Lieberman. In a far-reaching and unprecedented interview
conducted in Arabic by the Palestinian al-Quds newspaper, Lieberman suggested the total
separation of Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs.43 Among other revealing proposals, Lieberman’s
central point in the interview was to reiterate his belief in a two-state solution, albeit based on
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strict separatism. Instead of the concept of “land for peace,” enshrined in UN Security Council
Resolution 242, Lieberman—the founder of the Yisrael Beytenu (Israel Is Our Home) Party born
in Soviet-era Moldova—proposes “land for people” instead. Advocating that the large settlement
blocs in the West Bank and East Jerusalem become Israeli, and that Palestinian towns and villages
inside Israel become Palestinian, he rejects the notion of an Israeli state with Palestinian citizens
existing alongside a Palestinian state with no Jews. In short, his vision is of “two nations, Jewish
and Palestinian, and not one Palestinian and another binational,” referring to the 20 percent
Palestinian minority in Israel.44 Without clarifying whether transfer would be limited exclusively
to the Wadi Ara borderlands, Lieberman is vague about how he envisions achieving this goal of
ethnic separation and what it means for mixed Arab-Jewish cities within Israel. Earlier instances
of his plans, most notably his suggestion to shift the border of Umm al-Fahm against the will of
its inhabitants, leaves little to the imagination.45
Ethnically homogenous states along such lines may have been an ideal of late nineteenth and
early twentieth-century Europe, but the implications are grating for self-identifying liberal Zionists
in the twenty-first century. Israel’s former foreign minister and opposition MK Tzipi Livni, for
example, has also advocated for separation into two states, guided by concerns to preserve
Jewishness but always with a nod to the liberal democratic protections for minority groups.
Lieberman, however, admits that Palestinians inside Israel would always exist as second-class
citizens. Rather than promote such a condition, he wants to see exclusive Jewish self-
determination in Israel, a state that would be ethnically cleansed of Palestinians. By removing the
mask of liberal Zionism—going some way in conceding that Israel cannot be both democratic and
Jewish—Lieberman voices a greater concern for Israel’s exclusive Jewishness. Unlike Netanyahu,
who wants to maintain Israeli security west of the Jordan without conceding rights, Lieberman is
ready to give up on territory as long as he can secure the principle of ethnic homogeneity.
In denaturalizing Palestinians inside Israel, Lieberman’s plan is therefore at odds with more
traditional visions of two-state separation, as well as with the proponents of either renewed
autonomy or annexation. The prerequisite for his vision is rooted in the advancement of
economic interests and development (especially in Area C of the West Bank), and the full
economic development of the Gaza Strip on condition of Hamas’s demilitarization. Echoes of this
“economic peace” were made clear during the nomination hearings for Trump’s recently
confirmed ambassador to Israel (and former lawyer) David Friedman, who gamely touted such
views while at the same time claiming that the two-state solution “remained the best possibility for
peace in the region.”46 “Economic peace” remains popular among leading policymakers in the
Trump administration. After a meeting with Bennett as part of a listening tour with Israeli and
Palestinian officials, Trump’s special representative for international negotiations, Jason Greenblatt,
tweeted about the “importance of working to improve the economic life of Palestinians.”47
Obama’s Legacy
There is reason to see these voices not as outliers, but as part of an emerging U.S. consensus that
is moving away from Palestinian sovereignty, with roots stretching back to the Obama
administration. As was argued in these pages some months ago, the legacy of Obama’s eight years
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in office is ultimately the bequest of a new paradigm that dispenses with the two-state model48—even
though U.S. acquiescence to the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 2334 in the final days of
2016 may have helped restore a traditional path.
In laying out a clear position on territory, settlements, and the inadmissibility and illegality of
unilateral changes to the 1967 lines, Resolution 2334 maintains the principle of “land for peace.”
Unlike Lieberman’s call for ethnic separation, Bennett’s “autonomy on steroids,” or Netanyahu’s
“state-minus,” the resolution’s text reads as a reaffirmation of a longstanding international
commitment to a version of the two-state solution that preserves (in principle) contiguous
territorial sovereignty. The resolution also calls for member states “to distinguish, in their relevant
dealings, between the territory of the State of Israel and the territories occupied since 1967.”49 The
introduction of a mechanism for differentiation along these lines, and the legal language opposing
settlement expansion even in the case of “natural growth,” underscores a baseline for preserving
Palestinian sovereignty claims and the possibility of international legal sanction should colonization
continue unabated.
At the same time, the resolution contains no enforcement mechanism. Against the backdrop of
unchecked settlement expansion, such a belated measure may therefore have little power to reverse
the staggering transformations already underway in the occupied Palestinian territories. Expanding
on the U.S. abstention from the Security Council vote, and the principles that governed the Obama
administration’s policies, the departing secretary of state, John Kerry, offered an extensive defense of
the U.S. position. His exhortations, however, may have been “too little and too late.”50 Yet despite its
shortcomings, and the late timing, the passage of the UN vote did in fact demonstrate to Palestinians
that diplomatic pressure can be brought to bear in response to their precarious position on the
ground. It therefore served as a meaningful coda to the frustration of the Obama years,
highlighting the ways in which a diplomatic “no” can be a powerful tool for Palestinians, one that
will inevitably have to be exercised with greater frequency in the months and years ahead.
Regional Work-Arounds
In light of the Obama legacy, is there a plausible argument to be made that Trump’s victory, like
Netanyahu’s reelection in 2015, could somehow be “good for Palestine”?51 While it certainly has
clarified the contours of political debate and widened the options under diplomatic consideration,
the early months of 2017 have not been promising. From the Knesset’s legalization of settlement
outposts to the destruction of homes in the so-called unrecognized village of Umm al-Hiran in
the Negev, the prospects look bleak.52 Moreover, the convergence of Trump and Netanyahu
around a “regional approach” involving “newfound Arab partners in the pursuit of a broader
peace and peace with the Palestinians” raises further troubling signals.53 Such an approach may be
used as a tool to promote diplomatic negotiations—like the Arab League’s reaffirmation of the
Arab Peace Initiative at its Amman summit in March—but it can also serve to sideline the
Palestinians.54
The circuitous avoidance of direct engagement with the Palestinians in favor of regional powers
purporting to represent them has a long and checkered history. From Egypt’s representation of
Palestinian interests in the 1979–82 autonomy talks, to Jordan’s role in the 1987 Peres-Hussein
Neither Two States nor One: The Palestine Question in the Age of Trump
66 || Journal of Palestine Studies
London Agreement and the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation at Madrid in 1991, regional allies
have often served as enablers of various U.S. peace initiatives. More often than not, this has not
worked in the Palestinians’ favor. The context of 2017, however, presents a new challenge: the
unprecedented and de facto normalization between Israel and the Gulf countries, from high-tech
collaboration to talk of a train line extending from Haifa to the Arabian Peninsula.55 Recent
regional gas deals in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the currently shared interest between Israel
and so-called Sunni Arab states to counter Iranian influence, have further reconfigured
geopolitical relations in problematic ways.56
Against this backdrop, Netanyahu’s intimations of “outside-in” peacemaking and the use of
regional alliances that he discussed in his meeting with Trump are not entirely surprising.57 In
fact, reports have emerged of a scuttled attempt by Netanyahu to push through a deal with
Jordan’s King Abdullah and Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Aqaba in 2016.58
Abandoning the Aqaba exercise as his domestic coalition talks ran aground, Netanyahu reportedly
told Kerry that he could not sell a renewal of this approach to his right-wing government. This
has not stopped his minister of intelligence, Yisrael Katz, from pushing regional solutions in
further meetings with Trump. “Relations already exist between Israel and Sunni Arab states in the
region,” Katz told an interviewer from the Washington Post. “We are not allowed to say which
but they do include countries where we have no peace agreement or diplomatic relations.”59
Beyond intelligence sharing, Katz emphasized “regional economic peace,” suggesting that it would
help “bring about the diplomatic, political peace, which is more complicated for all different
reasons.”60 The devil, as always, is in the details. It is worth recalling the words of Likud MK
Kisch, who also spoke of a regional solution as part of his autonomy plan revival: “The plan is not
perfect, and I cannot solve this issue at present . . . it would be pushed off into the future, when a
solution within a regional discussion with Egypt and Jordan might be arrived at.”61 In this way,
regional work-arounds also serve as a means of deferring Palestinian sovereignty indefinitely.
* * *
Given the emerging constellation of Israeli alternatives to sovereignty, a White House overly
solicitous of Netanyahu, and an inhospitable regional environment, how might the Palestinians
respond? The priority might be to frame demands for citizenship and sovereignty in the clearest
possible manner, resisting notions of truncated autonomy at every turn.62 Israelis are increasingly
aware that the possibility of maintaining the state’s Jewish character alongside its democratic
identity is strained as never before. Even the right wing has been forced to articulate alternatives,
both as a means of avoiding the accusation of apartheid and in order to curtail the growing
demands to provide Palestinians under their control with political rights. Rather than choosing a
more expansive definition of citizenship that would accommodate non-Jews in line with a civic
Israeli identity, the march toward narrow ethnic forms of belonging seem to have solidified.63
In Trump’s America, this dissonance is now debated openly among the political class, without
the repercussions that used to inhibit honest political discussion of the Palestinian predicament.64
The fraying attempt to align Jewishness and democracy does not sit well with the same
progressive class so openly battling Trump’s wider agenda. Emerging forms of Jewish-Muslim
solidarity, for example, speak to more profound changes ahead.65
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Domestically, Netanyahu faces increasing pressure from those demanding either outright
annexation (of the occupied Palestinian territories) or new forms of autonomy. Some would argue
that he still has no real intention of abandoning the two-state solution.66 But the evidence is
mounting that a collision with Bennett is on the immediate horizon.67 Netanyahu therefore clings
to his “prerequisites for peace” without outlining a more detailed solution to the Palestinian
question, avoiding the one-state model of annexation and citizenship along Rivlin’s lines, or a
modified two-state model that either accommodates minorities68 or removes them entirely from
ethnically defined state borders.
The more dangerous outcome, and also the more likely to take root, is the in-between
model of autonomy. The significance of autonomy’s revival has not been fully understood,
with observers instead outlining the grave risk is in “inching toward a one state solution.”69
In actual fact, Netanyahu stops short of such an outcome. Rather than answering the
unresolved questions of 1967 with direct annexation or territorial return, seeking an end
that enables Israel’s “overriding security control over the entire area west of the Jordan
River” confers no political rights on the inhabitants who live there. In fact far predating the
1993 Oslo Accords, this vision has always foreclosed a sovereign outcome for Palestinians:
neither two states nor one.
Netanyahu’s February 2017 visit to the United States clarifies Israel’s attempt to legitimize a
variant of a solution to the Palestinian question that has always been at the margins but is now
having its moment in the sun: a “state-minus,” a truncated form of self-rule, the triumph of
Begin’s own vision of “autonomy for individuals but not for territory”—or as Fleisher put it,
“personal rights, not national rights.” If Netanyahu were to promote such an approach, he
would make himself sound reasonable to the new administration, and further corner the
Palestinians. Since there is also a real possibility that the Trump White House would endorse
and promote such an idea,70 it is critical for it to be understood more concretely, and in
historical context.
Palestinians are unlikely to acquiesce to such a scheme, or to a regional deal that circumvents
them and bypasses sovereignty. What precisely might emerge from the constellation of measures
for economic advancement and opaque coordination with neighboring countries on new peace
initiatives remains to be seen. A new approach may incorporate the formalizing of provisional
borders via a U.S.-Israeli understanding on the boundaries of settlement blocs and some form of a
building slowdown outside those areas.71 There remains a real possibility that something along
these unilateral lines—combining elements of an autonomy plan, territorial annexation, and the
shell of a two-state model—would thereby cohere into a “solution” for the Palestinian question.72
If the U.S. government formally endorses such alternatives to meaningful sovereignty, the power
of the Palestinian refusal to capitulate will be more necessary than ever before. Beyond refusing to
play Trump’s or Netanyahu’s game, however, the question of how to direct the Palestinian
national struggle remains as relevant as ever.73 Whether the Palestinians demand citizenship
across all of the occupied Palestinian territories or separation into independent states with
redoubled efforts to secure meaningful sovereignty, a viable response requires a return to the
underlying principle of self-determination.74
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